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In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued its first judg-
ment against the Russian federation concerning queer1 rights2  in Alekseyev and 
Others v. Russia (2010).3 The ECHR held that Russia violated the applicant’s 
right to freedom of association under Article 11 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention)4 
and illegally discriminated against the applicants based on their queer status in 
violation of Article 14 of the Convention.5 In Alekseyev (2010), the City of Mos-
cow prevented the applicants and other queer rights advocates from hosting a 
pride march in support of queer rights.6 Nine years later, the ECHR faced yet 
another challenge under Article 11 and 14 of the Convention in Zhdanov and 
Others v. Russia, where various Russian registration agencies, and subsequently, 
the Russian courts, disallowed a group of applicants from registering queer non-
profit organizations and public associations within the Russian State.7 In essence, 
nine years after the Court found that Russia violated Article 11 and 14 of the 
Convention for discriminatory practices against members of the queer commu-
nity, Russia—relying on the same arguments they have used in past cases—is 
still ignoring the Court’s rulings and its obligations under the Convention. 
This Note seeks to provide a framework for the Court’s holding in Zhdanov 
to demonstrate the state of ECHR jurisprudence on queer rights and Russia’s 
resistance to implementing ECHR judgments on queer rights. It will also explore 
whether there is an effective way to bring Russia into compliance with the judg-
ments of the Court. Specifically, Part II of this Note will examine the case of 
 
 1 For this Note, I have decided to use the word “Queer” in place of the acronym LGBTQ+ 
(which stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Queer) because it is a recently re-
claimed term which is inclusive of the entire LGBTQ+ community. While many people, es-
pecially older generations, appropriately see the term as a slur, more recent generations of 
LGBTQ+ persons have reclaimed the term as a non-gendered term to refer to the community 
in which they belong. Keeping with this trend, I have decided to use the term as such here. 
See Susan D. James, Gay Man Says Millennial Term ‘Queer’ Is Like the ‘N’ Word, ABCNEWS 
(Nov. 12, 2013, 3:42 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/gay-man-millennial-term-queer-
word/story?id=20855582. 
 2 Kristen L. Thomas, Note, We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used to It: Freedom of As-
sembly and Gay Pride in Alekseyev v. Russia, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 473, 474 (2012). 
 3 Please note there is more than one case entitled Alekseyev and Others v. Russia which 
is why I include the year in order to distinguish them. 
 4 Commonly referred to as the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 5 Thomas, supra note 2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, Apps. Nos. 12200/08, 35949/11, 58282/12 ¶ 1, 3, (July 
16, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194448. 
608 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:605 
Zhdanov and Others v. Russia. Part III will explain Russia’s joining of the Coun-
cil of Europe and ratification of the Convention and the current tension between 
Russia and the ECHR. Finally, Part IV will analyze whether Russia can be 
brought to comply with the Court’s judgments on queer rights and offer a possi-
ble solution to bring Russia into compliance, concluding that the most optimal 
approach is continued internal advocacy.  
 
II. THE CASE OF ZHDANOV AND OTHERS V. RUSSIA 
 
This section of the Note sets out the Court’s judgment in Zhdanov and Others 
v. Russia. Part A introduces the relevant background information that led Russia 
to ratify the Convention and submit itself to the Court’s jurisdiction. Part B out-
lines the relevant domestic law, while Part C details the relevant international 
law. Part D describes the relevant factual and procedural history of the case, and 
finally, Part E lays out the ECHR’s holding. 
 
A. Background of Russian Ratification of the Convention  
 
Russia ratified and acceded to the Convention in 1998.8 At the time, Russia 
was seeking membership in the Council of Europe, which had adopted the Con-
vention in 1950 and created the ECHR.9 Russia applied for membership in the 
Council in 1992 and was invited to join in 1996.10 In joining the Council of Eu-
rope, Russia had to ratify the Convention and subject itself to the jurisdiction of 
the ECHR.11 Many Council of Europe member states voiced concern over Rus-
sia’s admission out of the fear it would lower the Council’s standards due to the 
lack of protections for human rights in Russia.12 Other member states hoped that 
admitting Russia and other Eastern European states would bring Russian law and 
the laws of the newly admitted states within the standards of the Council of Eu-
rope and the Convention.13  
As a part of the accession agreement Russia signed when joining the Council 
of Europe, Russia promised to ratify the Convention and Protocols 1, 2, 4, 7 and 
 
 8 Rachel M. Fleig-Goldstein, Note, The Russian Constitutional Court versus the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: How the Strasbourg Court Should Respond to Russia’s Refusal 
to Execute ECtHR Judgments, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 172, 173 (2017). 
 9 Id. at 186; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 10 Fleig-Goldstein, supra note 8, at 186. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 187. 
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11.14 Russia also promised to recognize Article 46 of the Convention, which pro-
vides that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judg-
ment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”15 Additionally, Russia 
agreed to change its domestic law in order to be consistent with the standards of 
the Council of Europe.16 Russia has fulfilled or partially fulfilled some of its 
promises, but not all of them.17 However, the reforms enacted by Russia were 
only made after long delay or were enacted without a change in practice by the 
Russian Government.18 
 
B. Relevant Domestic Law  
 
One must first understand the applicable law in order to understand the facts 
which brought Zhdanov to the ECHR. First, the Court examined relevant domes-
tic law—specifically, the Constitution of the Russian Federation.19 Article 30 § 
1 of the Russian Constitution guarantees the right to association and the right to 
form trade unions to protect certain interests, while also guaranteeing the free-
dom to actively publicly associate.20 Article 13 § 4 states, “Public associations 
shall be equal before the law”; however, Article 13 § 5 provides that:  
The creation and activities of public associations whose aims and 
actions are aimed at a forced change of the fundamental princi-
ples of the constitutional system and at violating the integrity of 
the Russian Federation, at undermining its security, at setting up 
armed units, and at instigating social, racial, national and reli-
gious strife shall be prohibited.21 
Those were the two articles of the Russian Constitution that the Court found 
appropriate to highlight before elaborating on the specific Russian statutes in-
volved in the case.   
 
 14 Id. 
 15 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Conven-
tion_ENG.pdf. 
 16 Fleig-Goldstein, supra note 8, at 187. 
 17 Id. at 188. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Zhandov, ¶ 54. 
 20 KONSTITUTSHIA ROSSIĪSKOĪ FEDERATSII [RF] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 12, 1993, art. 30 
§1(Russ.); Zhdanov, ¶ 54. 
 21 KONSTITUTSHIA ROSSIĪSKOĪ FEDERATSII [RF] [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 12, 1993, art. 13 
§1(Russ.); Zhdanov, ¶ 55. 
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The Court first set out the provisions of the Non-Profit Organizations Act.22 
Article 2 § 2 describes the purposes for which a non-profit can be registered.23 
In particular, the law states that non-profit organizations can be formed for the 
purpose of “protecting the rights and legitimate interests of citizens . . . .”24 Un-
der Article 3 § 1, legal entity status is acquired from the moment of registration 
with the state. This registration permits the non-profit organization to possess 
certain rights, including property ownership and participating in judicial pro-
ceedings as a named party.25 Under Article 13.1, registration of a non-profit or-
ganization is subject to Russian Federal Law and the decision of a federal exec-
utive body.26  
Pursuant to Article 23.1 § 1 of the Non-Profit Organizations Act, an applica-
tion for registration can be denied in any one of three cases: (1) If the articles of 
association do not meet the standards under Russian law; (2) If the registration 
documents are “incomplete or defective”; and (3) If the name of the organization 
is “insulting to the moral, national or religious feelings of citizens.”27 The regis-
tration authority has discretion, however, to permit an applicant to fix any defects 
with the registration documents.28 The Act also provides that registration deci-
sions are appealable and that further applications can be submitted after the re-
jection of a former application.29  
The Court examined the Public Association Act (PAA) as well,30 which com-
prises the requirements for the registration of a public association. Moreover, 
PAA § 3 provides that public associations may register with the state and act 
with legal entity status or act without registering and without acquiring legal en-
tity status.31 PAA § 7 bars the creation of a public association “whose aims or 
activities are extremist,” and PAA § 23 permits denial of an application for reg-
istration of a public association for the same reasons listed in the Non-Profits 
Organization Act under § 23.32 PAA § 27 states that public associations may 
 
 22 Zhdanov, at ¶ 56–60. 
 23 Федеральный закон от 12 января 1996 г.” О некоммерческих организациях” 
[Federal Law of January 12, 1996 “On Non-Profit Organizations”] Федеральные законы 
[The Federal Laws] 1996, Federal Law No. 7-FZ.; Zhdanov, ¶ 56. 
 24 Zhdanov, ¶ 56. 
 25 Федеральный закон от 12 января 1996 г.” О некоммерческих организациях” 
[Federal Law of January 12, 1996 “On Non-Profit Organizations”] Федеральные законы 
[The Federal Laws] 1996, Federal Law No. 7-FZ.; Zhdanov, ¶ 57. 
 26 Zhdanov, ¶ 57. 
 27 Федеральный закон от 12 января 1996 г.” О некоммерческих организациях” 
[Federal Law of January 12, 1996 “On Non-Profit Organizations”] Федеральные законы 
[The Federal Laws] 1996, Federal Law No. 7-FZ.; Zhdanov, ¶ 58. 
 28 Zhdanov, ¶ 58. 
 29 Федеральный закон от 12 января 1996 г.” О некоммерческих организациях” 
[Federal Law of January 12, 1996 “On Non-Profit Organizations”] Федеральные законы 
[The Federal Laws] 1996, Federal Law No. 7-FZ.; Zhdanov, ¶ 59. 
 30 Zhdanov, ¶ 61–66. 
 31 Id. ¶ 61. 
 32 Id. ¶ 62, 65. 
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“defend their rights and the rights of their members before the State and munic-
ipal authorities,” and if they are registered and possess legal-entity status, they 
may directly participate “in the decision-making process of the State and munic-
ipal authorities.”33 
Under the Russian Suppression of Extremism Act (RSEA), “extremist activ-
ity” includes the “forcible change to the foundations of the constitutional system 
and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation” and the “incitement of 
social, racial, ethnic or religious discord.”34 In defining an “extremist organiza-
tion,” the RSEA provides that this classification requires a judicial tribunal to 
have ruled either that the organization or association should be dissolved or that 
its activity is prohibited because such activity is considered “extremist.”35 Ac-
cording to RSEA, organizations or associations may be dissolved or banned if 
they advance “extremist activity” that has the potential to create a real risk of 
societal damage.36  
The ECHR then outlined the provisions of two additional Russian laws. Under 
the Family Code, Article 12 suggests marriage is between only a man and a 
woman.37 The State Language Act provides that when using the Russian Lan-
guage as the State language, the comingling of terms or expressions that “are 
incompatible with the modern academic norms of the language” is prohibited 
unless there is no “adequate equivalent” in the Russian language.38  
 
C. Relevant International Law 
 
Article 11 § 1 of the Convention provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, includ-
ing the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”39 
Article 11 § 2 states: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
 
 33 Id. ¶ 66. 
 34 Id. ¶ 67. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. ¶ 68. 
 37 Id. ¶ 69. 
 38 Id. ¶ 70. 
 39 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
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restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the 
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.40  
These sections are the essential provisions which protect freedom of associa-
tion and assembly under the Convention and bind parties to enforce and ensure 
these rights. These provisions are also the basis of the claims associated with 
Zhdanov as brought to the ECHR.  
The applicants brought other claims against Russia under Article 14 of the 
Convention, which concerns discrimination.41 Article 14 maintains that “[t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be se-
cured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.”42 This provision justifies the 
applicants’ claim that the denial of registration not only violated their right to 
freely associate, but that in the denial of that right, Russia also discriminated 
against them in violation of the Convention.  
The Court was also compelled to examine Article 35 of the Convention be-
cause of actions committed by one of the parties bringing the case prior to the 
judgment of the Court.43 Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention states, “The Court 
shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 
if it considers that . . . the application is . . . an abuse of the right of individual 
application.”44 The Russian Government invoked this Article, alleging that the 
party made demeaning comments about the judges of the Court after the rejection 
of one of his claims.45 The Russian Government asserted that his actions were a 
violation of Article 35, and therefore, his application was inadmissible.46  
Finally, the Court acknowledged relevant Council of Europe documents. The 
relevant document in this case was a 2010 recommendation, adopted by the 
Council of Europe, that addressed the freedom of association and sexual orien-
tation and gender identity.47 The document stated: 
Member states should take appropriate measures to ensure, in ac-
cordance with Article 11 of the Convention, that the right to free-
dom of association can be effectively enjoyed without 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Zhdanov, ¶ 167. 
 42 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 43 Zhdanov, ¶ 76. 
 44 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Zhda-
nov, ¶ 16. 
 45 Zhdanov, ¶ 77. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. ¶ 74. 
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discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity; in particular, discriminatory administrative procedures, in-
cluding excessive formalities for the registration and practical 
functioning of associations, should be prevented and removed; 
measures should also be taken to prevent the abuse of legal and 
administrative provisions, such as those related to restrictions 
based on public health, public morality and public order.48  
The recommendation asserts that members should not only support the activ-
ities of organizations seeking to defend the human rights of queer persons, but 
also that members-states should consult with these organizations to enact polices 
that will promote the human rights of queer persons.49 Considering that the 
Council of Europe adopted the Convention and the recommendation, the recom-
mendation weighs on Russia’s obligations under the Convention. 
 
D. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The Zhdanov case arose from three applications against Russia under Article 
34 of the Convention.50 Article 34 of the Convention provides the right to any 
person, non-governmental organization, or group of people to apply for relief the 
Court if they believe they are victims of a violation of the Convention by one of 
the countries party to the Convention.51 Under Article 25(1) of the Convention, 
the parties to the Convention cannot impede any person from applying to the 
ECHR.52 The applicants in Zhdanov comprised four Russian nationals and three 
Russian non-profits, and the applications were filed in 2008, 2011, and 2012 re-
spectively.53 All three applications alleged violations of the freedom of associa-
tion and discrimination in violation of the Convention.54 The applicants in the 




 48 The Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Minis-
ters to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orienta-
tion or Gender Identity ¶ 9 (2010), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?Ob-
jectId=09000016805cf40a. 
 49 Id. ¶ 11–12. 
 50 Zhdanov, ¶ 1. 
 51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Zhdanov, ¶ 1. 
 54 Id. ¶ 3. 
 55 Id. 
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i. The First Application: Mr. Aleksandr Zhdanov (Regional Public 
Association “Rainbow House”) 
 
After the city of Tyumen, Russia, refused to permit a gay pride march, Ale-
ksandr Zhdanov applied to register a regional public association, named “Rain-
bow House,” in June 2006.56 Rainbow House’s goal was to defend the rights of 
queer persons.57 The registration authority commissioned an expert opinion from 
a Russian agency.58 The study found that the likely activities of Rainbow House 
would “destroy the moral values of society” and that it would “undermine the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation by decreasing its 
population.”59 The study further found that the actions of Rainbow House would 
be “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation” that would “attempt[] to 
increase the number of such citizens by converting those who, without such prop-
aganda, would have retained a traditional sexual orientation,” and therefore con-
stituted “extremist activities.”60 The local registration authority denied Rainbow 
House’s registration, basing its decision on the findings of the expert report and 
adding that Rainbow House’s “activities might infringe the rights and freedoms 
of others, jeopardise the constitutionally protected institutions of family and mar-
riage and encourage social and religious hatred and enmity.”61 The registration 
authority also concluded that Rainbow House was an “extremist organization” 
by citing to the report’s reasoning, which concluded that Rainbow House’s 
“propaganda” of non-traditional sexual orientation would essentially make peo-
ple queer.62  
On appeal, Zhdanov, challenging the local registration authority’s decision, 
argued that only a judicial ruling could declare an organization an extremist or-
ganization.63 He also disputed the local registration authority’s conclusions, 
claiming that Rainbow House’s goal was to “promote homosexuality or gay mar-
riage.”64  Zhdanov contended the purpose of Rainbow House was to only “defend 
the rights of homosexuals and to promote tolerance of diversity.”65 Zhdanov then 
asserted that the conclusion of the local registration authority constituted sexual 
orientation discrimination.66 Following several appeals, the local registration au-
thority’s decision was upheld as “lawful, well reasoned and justified”67 by 
 
 56 Id. ¶ 9, 10. 
 57 Id. ¶ 10. 
 58 Id. ¶ 12. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. ¶ 14. 
 62 Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. 
 63 Id. ¶ 16. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. ¶¶ 19. 
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subsequent administrative authorities and courts, which merely adopted the local 
registration authority’s reasoning.68   
In May 2007, while litigation concerning the first attempt to register Rainbow 
House was on appeal, Zhdanov resubmitted an application for registration.69 In 
June 2007, the local registration authority rejected the application again for the 
same substantive reasons it rejected the first application, plus for application pro-
cess violations.70 In addition to citing the “extremist nature” of Rainbow House’s 
activities, the local registration authority also cited technical errors for rejecting 
the application.71 These technical oversights included not stapling the applica-
tion, a typo, and a deficiency in the definition for the procedure of appointing 
one of the governing bodies.72 
Zhdanov immediately appealed the local registration authority’s determina-
tion and requested that the decision rejecting the second application be declared 
unlawful.73 Meanwhile, for reasons which are unclear, on an unspecified date, 
the local registration authority commissioned two more expert opinions from two 
separate Russian legal institutes.74 One non-binding opinion concluded that the 
activities of Rainbow House may threaten the rights of heterosexual citizens and 
constitutes propaganda that could promote social discord, threaten Russian na-
tional security and territorial integrity, and increase the number of homosexu-
als.75 The second non-binding opinion found that Rainbow House was an ex-
tremist organization because the name ‘Rainbow House’ “was insulting to the 
moral, national and religious feelings of citizens,” and the activities of the asso-
ciations could provoke violence.76 The second expert opinion also deemed Rain-
bow House an extremist organization because (1) it sought to protect the rights 
of people of a “non-traditional sexual orientation,” which could include pedo-
philes, and (2) the association’s goal of supporting persons with HIV/AIDS 
would violate those person’s right to confidentiality.77 Finally, it concluded that 
Rainbow House’s mission to defend queer rights would interfere with the right 
of private life under the Russian Constitution and that interference with private 
life, even for its protection, was unconstitutional.78  
On subsequent appeals, the local registration authority’s decision to reject the 
second application was upheld as lawful, and there was no violation of the free-
dom of association because Rainbow House could continue to function 
 
 68 Id. ¶¶ 17–20. 
 69 Id. ¶ 21. 
 70 Id. ¶ 22. 
 71 Id. ¶ 23. 
 72 Id. ¶ 22. 
 73 Id. ¶ 23. 
 74 Id. ¶ 24. 
 75 Id. ¶ 25. 
 76 Id. ¶ 26. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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unregistered.79 Also on appeal, the Court found that Rainbow House had not 
been declared an extremist organization, but that its activities were of an extrem-
ist character and therefore not compliant under Article 23.1 § 1 of the Non-Profit 
Organizations Act, which governs the registrations of non-profit organizations.80 
It was further held that Rainbow House’s articles of association contained pro-
visions that indicated extremism.81 The rejection of Rainbow House’s registra-
tion was also upheld because Rainbow House’s actions could “undermine the 
foundations of the family and marriage” in violation of the Russian Constitu-
tion.82 On appeal, the Court finally determined that Zhdanov could reapply if he 
corrected the problems in the articles of association; however, subsequent reap-
plications were rejected in May and November 2010 for the same reasons despite 
changes to the applications.83 
 
ii. The Second Application: Mr. Nikolay Alekseyev (Autonomous Non-
Profit Organization “Movement for Marriage Equality”)  
 
Nikolay Alekseyev founded the Movement for Marriage Equality in Novem-
ber 2009 seeking to advocate for marriage equality and the promotion of queer 
rights particularly through legislating same-sex marriage.84 He attempted to reg-
ister the association in December 2009 with the local registration service in Mos-
cow.85 The Moscow registration service rejected the application for registration 
finding violations of the Non-Profit Organization Act, the Family Code, as well 
as technical violations.86 Alekseyev immediately appealed the decision.87 He 
contended that the decision of the Moscow registration authority violated his 
freedom of association under the Russian Constitution and the Convention and 
further asserted that the reasons for rejecting the application for registration were 
erroneous and unlawful.88  
On appeal, a Russian lower court dismissed the complaint, finding that the 
objectives of the Movement for Marriage Equality were “incompatible with 
basic morality,” and that legalization of same-sex marriage would undermine 
“the conceptions of good and evil . . . and result in a decrease in the birth rate.”89  
 
 79 Id. ¶ 27. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. ¶ 29. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. ¶ 30. 
 84 Id. ¶ 32. 
 85 Id. ¶ 33. 
 86 Id. at ¶ 34. 
 87 Id. ¶ 35. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. ¶ 36. 
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It further concluded that promoting the legalization of same-sex marriage was 
contrary to “established morality,” as the Family Code provided that marriage 
was between a man and woman, and that the Code sought to protect the ideals of 
“family, motherhood and childhood.”90 Finally, the court held that there was no 
violation of Russia’s obligations under the Convention because “the right to 
marry was to be exercised in accordance with national laws.”91 Alekseyev ap-
pealed again, but the lower court’s decision was affirmed.92 
 
iii. The Third Application: Mr. Nikolay Alekseyev, Mr. Kirill 
Nepomnyashchiy, and Aleksandr Naumchik (Regional Public 
Sports Movement “Sochi Pride House”) 
 
In October 2011, Niklay Alekseyev, along with Kirill Nepomnyashchiy and 
Aleksandr Namchik, also founded a public movement called “Sochi Pride 
House.”93 The goal of the organization was to promote queer rights in the sports 
context and to create a forum for discussion of those rights in sports during the 
Sochi Olympic Games.94 The three men submitted an application of registration 
to the local registration authority.95 The authority refused to register Sochi Pride 
House for a variety of technical issues, including that the name contained words 
which did not exist in Russian in violation of § 1(6) of the State Language Act, 
and that the articles of association did not indicate Sochi Pride House’s associa-
tion type.96  
In December 2011, the three men challenged the decision of the local regis-
tration authority in the local district court.97 Their challenge had two grounds: 
First, they contended that it was common practice to use words from other lan-
guages in the name of associations to give the associations original names and 
that there were other associations with the words “pride” and “house” in their 
names.98 Second, they pointed out that paragraph 1.1 of their articles of associa-
tion prescribed that the Sochi Pride House was a “public movement.”99 Using 
almost identical reasoning from the court decisions involving the refusal to 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. ¶ 37. 
 93 Id. ¶ 39. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. ¶ 40. 
 96 Id. ¶ 41. 
 97 Id. ¶ 42. 
 98 Id. The three applicants presented official data which indicated that there were eleven 
registered associations which contained the word “pride” in their name, and there were forty 
registered associations which contained the word “house” in their name. 
 99 Id. 
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register the Movement for Marriage Equality, the local district court upheld the 
decision of the registration authority and dismissed the suit.100 The parties were 
not present for the pronouncement of the judgment and the judgement was 
mailed to them.101  
The parties appealed the judgment.102 On appeal, the three men argued that 
the denial of registration amounted to discrimination, and because sexual orien-
tation was not a matter of choice, the actions of Sochi Pride House would not 
increase the number of homosexuals.103 The court returned the appeal citing that 
both the short form and the full appeal were received outside of the one-month 
timeline allowed for appeals.104 The parties then appealed the denial of the ap-
peal.105 The appellate court merely ruled that the decision of the lower court to 
be “lawful, well reasoned and justified.”106  
 
E. The Court’s Judgment  
 
The Court initially examined the Russian Government’s claim that Alekseyev 
bused the right of individual application in violation of Article 35 of the Con-
vention; therefore, his application was inadmissible.107 In evaluating the Con-
vention and the Court’s jurisprudence, the Court found Alekseyev’s application 
inadmissible.108 Under the Court’s standards, Article 35 is applied to find a an 
application inadmissible in two situations: (1) when the petition is based on un-
true facts or (2) “where an applicant used particularly vexatious, contemptuous, 
threatening or provocative language in his communication with the Court,” in-
cluding when it is directed toward the judges.109 In explaining these two situa-
tions, the Court also noted that Article 35’s application was not restricted to just 
those two instances; rather, Article 35 could apply in any situation where an ap-
plicant’s conduct was “manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individ-
ual application.”110 For instance, in The Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia,111 
the Court found “vexing manifestations of irresponsibility and a frivolous atti-
tude towards the Court,” could lead to the rejection of an application.112  
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Prior to the Court’s proceedings in Zhdanov, the Court ruled on another case 
in 2018, Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, where Alekseyev was one of the appli-
cants.113 The Court, however, rejected Alekseyev’s non-pecuniary damages 
claim.114 In its claim, the Russian Government did not cite particular statements 
nor did it provide the Court with the exact social media accounts.115 The Russian 
government only told the Court that the social media accounts were hosted by 
Instagram and VKontakte.116 In looking up Alekseyev’s accounts, the Court ob-
served statements about the ECHR and its judges that were “virulently and per-
sonally offensive and threatening.”117 Alekseyev posted pictures of the judges 
with captions like “alcoholic” and “drug addict,” stated that he wished the judges 
“would ‘snuff it as soon as possible like dogs,’” and then threatened to torture 
the judges with vodka, among other degrading comments.118 
 Considering that these accounts had thousands of followers, the Court deter-
mined that they were meant for “the widest possible circulation” and that Ale-
kseyev was trying to “harm and tarnish the image and reputation of the [Court] 
and its members.”119 In response, the ECHR sent Alekseyev a letter stating that 
his pending applications before the Court may be ruled inadmissible if he con-
tinued making his comments.120 Alekseyev stated that those accounts were not 
his personal accounts, but he never denied making the statements.121 Following 
the letter, new statements were published describing the Court “as ‘a rubbish 
heap’ and calling its judges ‘European corrupt scum and homophobic.’”122 
The Court first held that these new statements could be appropriately con-
nected with the Zhdanov proceedings because of the warning letter written to 
Alekseyev that stated these threatening remakes may be considered in the judge-
ment.123 The Court further reasoned that by continuing to publish these com-
ments after the warning letter, Alekseyev showed “disrespect to the very institu-
tion to which he had applied for the protection of his rights” and that “it is 
unacceptable to seek the protection of a court in which the applicant has lost all 
trust.”124 The Court held that Alekseyev’s actions “constitute[d] ‘a vexing man-
ifestation of irresponsibility and a frivolous attitude towards the Court’, amount-
ing to contempt” and violated Articles 34  and 35 of the Convention.125 There-
fore, his applications were “declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of 
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application.”126 However, the Court held that while Alekseyev’s applications had 
been declared inadmissible, it could still examine the merits of his application to 
the extent that they were brought up by the other applicants including the Move-
ment for Marriage Equality.127  
In addressing the applicants’ Article 11 claim, the ECHR found that the Rus-
sian government had illegally denied the applicants their right to freedom of as-
sociation.128 The Court first noted that forming organizations to advance a col-
lective interest was an essential aspect of the freedom of association.129 It further 
observed that “[t]he harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied 
identities is essential for achieving social cohesion.”130 When restricting the free-
dom of association, such limitations must be used “sparingly,” and that “only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom.”131 
In order for a restriction to be upheld, it must meet the definition of “necessary” 
as prescribed in Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Convention; however, the Court 
noted the narrowness of this exception, which is coupled “with rigorous Euro-
pean supervision.”132  
As Article 11, paragraph 2 sets out, the only time a restriction can be placed 
on the freedom of association is when the restriction is “prescribed by law and 
[is] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”133 In determin-
ing whether there is a violation of Article 11, the Court must determine whether 
the interference with the right “was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ 
and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ‘rel-
evant and sufficient.’”134 The Court must also find that the national authorities 
appropriately applied standards that conform with the Convention.135  
In applying the legal standards to the facts, the Court first determined that 
interference occurred with the freedom of association because the denial of reg-
istration for a non-profit like Movement for Marriage Equality meant that the 
organization could not exist under Russian law.136 As for public associations 
such as Rainbow House and Sochi Pride House, under Russian law the denial of 
registration meant that they could exist, but could not exercise rights granted to 
organizations with legal entity status, such as the right to own property or the 
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right to carry out media campaigns.137 For all three organizations, the denial of 
registration denied each entity certain rights which restricted the right to freedom 
of association for the applicant-organizations and their applicant-founders.138 
The ECHR quickly disposed of any assertions by the Russian government that 
registration irregularities were the reason why the registration applications were 
denied determining that the aims of the organizations were “a decisive role in the 
decisions to refuse their registration.”139 In determining whether the interference 
was prescribed by law, the Court determined the interference with the freedom 
of association was based in the Non-Profit Organizations Act and the Public As-
sociations Act.140 The Court then summarized the aims Russia asserted as legit-
imate for restricting the freedom of association in this case:  
[T]o protect society’s moral values and the institutions of family 
and marriage; to protect Russia’s sovereignty, safety and territo-
rial integrity, which they considered to be threatened by a de-
crease in the population caused by the activities of LGBT associ-
ations; to protect the rights and freedoms of others; and to prevent 
social or religious hatred and enmity, which in their view could 
be incited by the activities of LGBT associations and which 
might lead to violence. The Court will assess whether the refusals 
to register the applicants’ organisations served to advance those 
declared aims.141  
Citing to Bayev and Others v. Russia,142 the ECHR reiterated that limiting 
debate on queer issues for the sake of protecting morals was not a legitimate aim 
and that “maintaining family values and the institution of marriage as the foun-
dation of society” was compatible with social recognition of homosexuality.143 
In the alternative, the Court did maintain that under Article 12 and 14 of the 
Convention, read in light of Article 8, state-parties to the Convention were still 
permitted to restrict same-sex marriage because the Convention allows parties to 
define marriage.144 However, the Court went on to state that this case did not 
involve whether Russia should legalize same-sex marriage; rather, it asked if the 
protection of morals was a legitimate reason under Article 11 of the Convention 
for the Russian government to restrict the advocacy for same-sex marriage and 
queer rights through a nonprofit entity and public associations.145 Also, the Court 
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found Russia’s assertion that other European states had not legalized same-sex 
marriage as justification for its actions was irrelevant because “conferring sub-
stantive rights on homosexual persons is fundamentally different from recogniz-
ing their right to campaign for such rights.”146 The Court did find that “[t]here is 
no ambiguity about the other member States’ recognition” and promotion of 
queer rights.147 For these reasons, the ECHR held that “the protection of moral 
values or the institutions of family and marriage” were not legitimate reasons for 
restricting the freedom of association.148  
In reference to Russia’s national security and public safety arguments, the 
Court reiterated that such principles must be interpreted restrictively.149 Russia 
based its national security and public safety claims off of the assertion that the 
work of the organizations would violate its territorial sovereignty because the 
promotion of homosexuality would cause people to become queer, thus causing 
birthrates to fall and the population to decrease.150 The Court responded by reit-
erating that it already held that there was no connection between the promotion 
of homosexuality and population levels.151 It also pointed out that the Russian 
Government had not presented any evidence of how an unfounded and theoreti-
cal population decrease would affect national security.152  
In further referencing the Russian government’s arguments, the Court pointed 
out that that “it is the right not to be confronted with any display of same-sex 
relations or promotion of LGBT rights . . . that the national authorities saught to 
protect by refusing to register the applicant assocaitions.”153 The Court rebuked 
Russia’s arguments, stating, “the Convention does not guarantee the right not to 
be confronted with opinions that are opposed to one’s own convictions.”154 Ad-
ditionally, the Court held that “it would be incompatible with the underlying val-
ues of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group 
were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority.”155 It further stated 
that if Russia’s arguments were true, then “a minority groups rights to freedom 
of religion, expression, assembly and association would become merely theoret-
ical rather than practical and effective as required by the Convention,” and, for 
that reason, “[t]he Court has therefore consistently declined to endorse policies 
and decisions which embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual 
majority against a homosexual minority.”156 For those reasons, the Russian 
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government declining to register these organizations was not a legitimate aim in 
protecting the rights of others.157 
However, the Court accepted the Russian government’s contentions that al-
lowing these organizations to operate would cause “social or religious hatred and 
enmity” which could lead to violence.158 The Court stated, “social or religious 
hatred and enmity represents a danger for the social peace and political stability 
of democratic states and is likely to lead to violence.”159 Therefore, the Court 
held that Russia did have a legitimate aim in seeking to prevent disorder and the 
Court accepted that this was a legitimate reason for preventing the organizations 
from registering.160  
Since the Court did identify a legitimate aim, the Court had to determine 
whether the measures were a necessity to democracy.161 The Russian govern-
ment claimed that it was protecting the organizations by preventing registration 
because they could be subject to violence from people who disproved of homo-
sexuality.162 The Court then addressed the fact that the Convention did not just 
impose a negative duty onto member states to not interfere with the freedom of 
association, but that it also imposed a positive duty “to secure the effective en-
joyment of the right to freedom of association.”163 Having only a negative duty 
would be inconsistent with purpose of Article 11 of the Convention.164 In its 
analysis, the Court observed that governmental authorities must protect the func-
tioning of the right because otherwise those people who may have opposing 
views could threaten and invoke fear which would deter people with minority 
beliefs from expressing their opinions.165 The Court stated that “[i]n a democracy 
the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the 
right of association.”166  
The Court found that the protection of minority rights is not a threat to “dem-
ocratic society” despite causing tensions.167 Furthermore, the Court stated that it 
was the duty of governmental authorities “to ensure that competing groups tol-
erate each other” and not to just remove the cause of the tensions.168 The Court 
then held “that it was the duty of the Russian authorities to take reasonable and 
appropriate measure to enable the applicant organi[z]ations to carry out their ac-
tivities without having to fear that they would be subjected to physical violence 
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by their opponents.”169 It then listed off other ways the Russian government 
could have acted to allow the organizations to operate without causing disor-
der.170 The Court then concluded that refusing to register the organizations was 
not “necessary in a democratic society” because the Russian government merely 
eliminated the source of tension by restricting the organization’s freedom of as-
sociation.”171 Therefore, there was a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.172  
The Court next turned to the applicants’ allegations that there had been a vio-
lation of Article 14 of the Convention.173 Article 14 provides that the rights in 
the “Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colo[]r, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”174 
The nature of Article 14 can only be violated in conjunction with a violation of 
one or more of the other rights listed in the Convention.175 Considering there was 
a violation of Article 11, the Court deemed it appropriate to analyze the Article 
14 claims.176 In order for there to be a violation of Article 14, “there must be a 
difference in the treatment of persons of relevantly similar situations,” and that 
difference of treatment must have “no objective and reasonable justification.”177 
Member states do have a narrow “margin of appreciation” in which they can 
identify situations where a difference of treatment is necessary, “but the final 
decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the 
Court.”178  
When examining whether there is a difference of treatment because of sexual 
orientation, the Court has held “that differences based solely on considerations 
of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention.”179 The Russian 
government argued that the applications for registration were not denied because 
of an organizations’ support for queer rights but because of irregularities with 
the registration documents.180 However, the Court did not find this argument 
persuasive.181 Since the Court had already concluded that the “aim of promoting 
LGBT rights was a decisive factor leading to the decision to refuse” to register 
the organizations, the Court concluded that there was a difference of treatment 
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based on sexual orientation.182 Since the Court had already concluded that no 
“reasonably or objectively justified” reason existed for refusing the registration 
of applications, there was also a violation of Article 14.183  Upon finding viola-
tions of the Convention, the Court awarded monetary reparations to the appli-
cants.184  
Russia’s payment of the judgment was due January 16, 2021, but as of the 
writing of this Note, Russia has not paid the Court’s judgment.185 Zhdanov 
demonstrates Russia’s use of the same arguments to defend its anti-queer laws 
in the face of the ECHR. As evidenced in Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, the 
Russian courts continually find arguments against the anti-queer rights laws ei-
ther invalid or unpersuasive.  Russia’s persistence in ignoring the ECHR juris-
prudence on queer rights is tied up with the recent tensions between Russia, the 
ECHR, and Council of Europe. As noted below, these tensions mean that Zhda-
nov will likely not be complied with and the state of the law in Russia concerning 
queer rights will remain the same.  
 
III. RUSSIA’S RELATION WITH THE CONVENTION AND THE COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE  
 
Section III of this Note focuses on where Russia currently stands in relation 
to the Convention and the Council of Europe. First, Part A addresses the found-
ing of the Council of Europe and its adoption of the Convention. Part B discusses 
Russia’s joining the Council of Europe and its ratification of the Convention. 
Finally, Part C lays out the current tensions between Russia and the ECHR.   
 
A. The Council of Europe and the Convention  
 
The Council of Europe, founded in 1949 and headquartered in Strasbourg, 
France, is Europe’s primary human rights organization.186 It is one of Europe’s 
oldest and largest organizations.187 The Council is financed by the member states 
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who’s contribution is based on population size and wealth.188 The two main bod-
ies of the Council of Europe are the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamen-
tary Assembly.189 The Committee of Ministers (the Committee) is the primary 
decision-making body of the Council of Europe, and while the Parliamentary 
Assembly monitors compliance of member states with their obligations to the 
Council of Europe, the Committee develops solutions to problems facing Eu-
rope.190 In 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention.191 
In 1959, the Council of Europe established the European Court of Human 
Rights to implement the Convention.192 The Court normally awards compensa-
tory damages through its judgments to parties who have suffered human rights 
violations under the Convention.193 The Court may also “impose on the respond-
ent state a requirement to eliminate violations, avoid their occurrence in the fu-
ture, and restore the applicant’s rights as they were before the violation (restitutio 
in integrum) by taking specific individual and general measures.”194 
Under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, all the parties to the Convention are 
bound by the judgments of the Court.195 Article 46 § 2 provides that the Com-
mittee of Ministers shall oversee the execution of any of the Court’s judg-
ments.196 In the event that the Committee of Ministers believes that a party to the 
Convention is refusing to abide by a judgment of the Court, then under § 4 of 
Article 46, the Committee of Ministers may refer the case to the Court to deter-
mine whether a party has violated its obligations under the Convention.197 Fi-
nally, if the Court determines that a party is in violation of one of its obligations 
under the Convention, then pursuant to § 5 of Article 46, the Court refers the 
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B. Russia Joins the Council of Europe and Ratifies the Convention 
 
In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe, and in 1998, it ratified the Con-
vention.199 It was an event of historical significance, as one of the great global 
superpowers who spent the Cold War battling the capitalist West had now joined 
an organization designed by capitalist Western Europe.200 In joining the Council 
of Europe and ratifying the Convention, Russia surrendered its ability to have 
the final say on human rights matters to the ECHR.201 While both experts from 
the Council of Europe and the Russian government concluded that Russia did 
not objectively meet the criteria for membership in the Council of Europe, Coun-
cil of Europe members thought that membership would promote human rights 
changes in Russia.202 Effectively, the idea was that the Council of Europe and 
the Court “would provide both the necessary socialization and outside legal sup-
port for carrying out liberal judicial and other reforms in Russia” including major 
advancements in human rights.203 Today, Russia is the Council of Europe’s larg-
est member state by population (143 million people) and contributes about ten 
percent of the Council of Europe’s budget.204 
During this post-Soviet Union era, Russia also took a much more liberal ap-
proach toward integrating international law and human rights norms into its legal 
system.205 Russia’s 1993 Constitution provided that both norms of international 
law and international agreements are important parts of the Russian legal sys-
tem.206 The 1993 Constitution also stated that if there was a conflict between 
Russia’s obligations under an international agreement and a Russian law, then 
the international agreement would prevail.207 
 
C. Recent Tensions Between Russia and the ECHR  
 
Unfortunately, twenty years later, Russia’s membership in the Council of Eu-
rope and acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction has not prevented continued deg-
radation of democracy and human rights in Russia.208 In July 2012, special 
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rapporteurs, whose responsibilities included monitoring Russia’s progress in ful-
filling its obligations to the Council of Europe, submitted a report to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.209 The report concluded that Russia 
was “at a crossroads” where, in terms of democratic progress, it was unclear 
which direction Russia would go.210 While an outpouring of cases to the Court 
from Russia demonstrates an acceptance of the Court by those applying to it for 
relief, “government officials have been less accepting of the [Court’s] findings 
of violations against Russia.”211  
While Russia does pay most of the monetary judgments awarded to victims of 
human rights violations, this is not necessarily a good indication.212 Most experts 
and diplomats agree that the human rights situation in Russia has, in the aggre-
gate, gotten worse.213 As Lauri Mälksoo points out, Russia paying victim’s com-
pensation without substantive change is similar to the medieval European con-
cept of paying money for one’s sins, resulting in people continually committing 
them or committing more of them.214  
In June 2013, Russia passed its infamous “Gay Propaganda” law which out-
lawed the dissemination of content related to the “promotion of nontraditional 
sexual relations to minors.”215 In essence, the law bans “providing children ac-
cess to information about LGBT people’s lives.”216 The law also made amend-
ments to three already existing laws.217 One such amendment added a provision 
which provided that “in order to protect children from information ‘harmful to 
their health, moral and spiritual development,’ measures must be taken to protect 
them from propaganda relating to ‘non-traditional sexual relationships.’”218 
However, protecting children is merely pretext for the law as legislative docu-
ments indicated that the law’s main goal was to prevent queer activism and as-
semblies and was more or less a direct reaction to the ECHR’s decision in Ale-
kseyev.219  The law was subsequently upheld by the Russian Constitutional Court 
in 2014.220 
In June 2017, the ECHR determined that Russia’s Gay Propaganda law was 
inconsistent with the Convention because it was discriminatory and violated the 
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freedom of expression.221 In Bayev and others v. Russia,222 three men were fined 
for having non-violent demonstrations promoting homosexuality in front of a 
school and library under the propaganda law.223 The ECHR rejected all of the 
Russian government’s arguments that justified the law on the basis of protecting 
morals, protecting family values, protecting public health, and protecting chil-
dren.224 The Court actually declared that the dissemination of information relat-
ing to same-sex relations was educational to young people.225 In its judgment, 
the ECHR found that the “Gay Propaganda” law violated Article 14 of the Con-
vention “because the legislation in question involved a predisposed bias toward 
the heterosexual majority against the homosexual minority and the government 
had not offered any convincing and weighty reasons justifying the difference in 
treatment.”226 Despite this ruling, the law remains on the books, and in the fall 
of 2018, the first Russian teenager was charged with violating it.227  
The biggest rebuke of the Court from Russia, however, came in December 
2015 when federal legislation was passed which permitted the Russian Consti-
tutional Court to declare judgments from an international tribunal inapplicable 
to Russia.228 The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is an independ-
ent court of constitutional review that has jurisdiction over all matters dealing 
with constitutional interpretation.229 The Constitutional Court in July 2015 stated 
that if there was an appropriate legal mechanism, the court “could deviate from 
its obligation to enforce an EC[t]HR judgment if this was the only possible way 
to avoid a violation of the fundamental principles and norms of the Russian Con-
stitution.”230 With the new law in place, in April 2016 the Constitutional Court 
declared a judgment of the ECHR on prisoner voting rights to be incompatible 
with the Russian Constitution and therefore impossible to implement.231  
This development in Russian law and how Russia addresses decisions from 
the ECHR is important because Russia’s Constitutional Court has played a 
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significant role in implementing ECHR judgments.232 In fact, more than fifty 
decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court have a basis in positions taken by 
the ECHR,233 and “[o]n many occasions the Russian [Constitutional Court] has 
explicitly affirmed that its interpretation of the Constitution takes into account 
legal findings of the ECHR in similar cases.”234 The Russian Constitutional 
Court has acknowledged in recent cases that are “testing implementation of 
ECHR judgments” that it has a duty “to find a lawful compromise with the 
ECHR.”235 The Russian Constitutional Court has also never questioned the an 
ECHR judgment on queer rights, and in fact the Russian Constitutional Court 
has cited to Alekseyev “to underline the importance of the right to freedom of 
assembly . . . .”236 However, the Gay Propaganda law remains in force and gov-
ernment actors still curtail queer advocacy. 
While the Russian Constitutional Court’s action in the prisoner voting rights 
case established a powerful precedent, a law entered force in 2017 allowing cer-
tain prisoners to vote in federal and municipal elections.237 This law was passed 
after the Constitutional Court suggested that changes to the criminal system 
could allow for sanctions that do not terminate voting rights.238 Despite the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court’s rebuke of the ECHR’s judgment, the ECHR had ac-
tually suggested that the Russian Constitution could be interpreted so as to pre-
vent a conflict between the Convention and the Russia Constitution.239 The 
passage of the law resulted in the Council of Minsters ending its supervision of 
Russia concerning compliance with ECHR’s judgement in September 2019.240  
 
IV. CAN RUSSIA BE BROUGHT TO COMPLY WITH ECHR DECISIONS ON 
QUEER RIGHTS? 
 
Section IV of this Note turns to the discussion of whether Russia can be 
brought into compliance with the ECHR’s judgments concerning queer rights. 
Part A discusses the importance of the Zhdanov case. Part B examines the via-
bility of the Council of Europe and the ECHR taking affirmative action against 
Russia for its refusal to implement ECHR judgments on queer rights. Part C 
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considers whether the ECHR should attempt to apply the Russian Constitution 
in its judgments to convince Russia to comply with ECHR judgments. Finally, 
Part D explains why domestic activism may be the best hope for advancing queer 
rights in Russia.  
 
A. The Importance of Zhdanov 
 
Zhdanov stands for a summary of the ECHR’s jurisprudence on queer rights 
in reference to Russia. The case embodies the state of the law as it stands today 
and marks the position of the ECHR towards Russia’s continued violations of 
queer persons’ right to assembly and association. The case also provides an over-
view of the arguments Russia uses to defend its restrictions on queer rights and 
demonstrates how Russia has continued to use arguments that the ECHR has 
persistently discredited and found unpersuasive. As in Bayev, Russia advanced 
similar arguments of morality and protection of family values as grounds to in-
terfere with queer person’s freedom of assembly and association, but the ECHR, 
citing to Bayev, reminded Russia that those are not justifiable grounds for limit-
ing the freedom of assembly and association.241 The ECHR’s language in Zhda-
nov remains dismissive of Russia’s arguments and systematically disposes of 
each argument as insufficient to justify curtailing queer rights. Zhdanov also rep-
resents one of the most recent instances in decades of case law from the ECHR 
narrowing “any potential room for states to treat people differently because of 
their sexual orientation.”242 A pertinent question arises: How can the ECHR and 
the Council of Europe convince Russia to follow its obligations under the Con-
vention to protect queer persons rights to freedom of association?  
Following Alekseyev (2010), Russia had to submit action plans for implement-
ing the decision to the Committee of Ministers.243 Russia has conveyed to the 
Committee of Ministers that it is acting to “ensure equal enjoyment of freedom 
of assembly by sexual minorities.”244 Russia has emphasized to the Committee 
of Ministers that it is training judges to apply ECHR standards to sexual minor-
ities.245 Of course, as Zhdanov and Russia’s adoption of the Gay Propaganda law 
demonstrate, these efforts seem to only be rhetoric aimed at the Committee of 
Ministers and the Council of Europe.246 For this reason, the Alekseyev case 
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remains open as the Committee of Ministers continues to monitor its implemen-
tation.247 
Zhandov is an important addition to ECHR case law because it is a reminder 
to Russia of its obligations under the Convention, harkening back to the Ale-
kseyev (2010) decision. Since 2014, when the Gay Propaganda law was upheld 
by the Russian Constitutional Court, “the most egregious decisions upholding 
restrictions of” queer rights by Russian courts—relating to the freedom of as-
sembly and expression—have been based on the Gay Propaganda law and the 
Russian Constitutional Court’s decision upholding the law.248 Russia’s refusal to 
implement ECHR decisions on queer rights has been recognized by some schol-
ars as an indication of the very real possibility that queer rights will become “the 
major, if not the only, point of principle discord between the Council of Europe 
and Russia.”249 
 
B. Attacking the Russian Constitutional Court and Punishing Russia 
 
One major impediment to the ECHR and its judgments is the Russian Consti-
tutional Court’s ability to declare ECHR judgments incompatible with the Rus-
sian Constitution and thus impossible to implement. “The Russian Constitutional 
Court held that if it determines that complying with an ECHR judgment would 
violate the Russian Constitution, then the ECHR judgement is ‘impossible’ to 
implement and the Russian government does not have to follow the judg-
ment.”250 Russia’s establishment of this legal regimen to counter the ECHR is 
completely incompatible with Article 46 of the Convention. While the Russian 
Constitutional Court stated that it must still try to find a way to compromise with 
the ECHR, the Russian Constitutional Court has effectively  declared itself su-
perior to the ECHR.251 As discussed above, the Russian Constitutional Court 
played an important role in ensuring that ECHR decisions were enforced by com-
pelling lawmakers to amend laws or by even overturning its own past interpre-
tations of the Russian Constitution to bring Russia into compliance with ECHR 
judgements.252 Now, if the Russian Constitutional Court simply interprets the 
judgements of the ECHR as being incompatible with the Russian Constitution, 
Russia does not have to implement them. Thus, the Russian Constitutional Court 
can overrule the ECHR and Russia can entirely ignore its legal obligations under 
the Convention.   
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In an opinion adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 253 
in March 2016, the Commission found that the Russian Constitutional Court’s 
newfound powers to overrule the ECHR were contradictory to Russia’s legal 
obligations.254 The Venice Commission insisted that Russia should use dialogue 
instead of invoking unilateral measures to confront discontent with the Council 
of Europe and the ECHR.255 The Commission’s opinion also stressed that Russia 
should amend the law and that the mere fact that the Russian Constitutional Court 
cannot amend the Constitution to be compatible with ECHR decisions itself is 
no excuse for refusing to implement ECHR decisions.256 The Venice Commis-
sion made clear the Council of Europe disproves of Russia’s actions concerning 
the implementation of ECHR judgments; nevertheless, by subsequent action, 
Russia and the Russian Constitutional Court have ignored the Venice Commis-
sion and the Council of Europe by maintaining that Russia has a legal right to 
refuse to implement ECHR decisions for being incompatible with the Russian 
Constitution.257 One month after the Venice Commission’s opinion was pub-
lished, the Russian Constitutional Court exercised its new authority and declared, 
for the first time, an ECHR decision impossible to implement because of its in-
compatibility with the Russian Constitution.258  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe could revoke Russia’s 
voting rights in the Assembly as it did when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014.259 
This move, however, led to Russia refusing to pay its funding contribution to the 
Council of Europe.260 The result was serious financial problems for the Council 
of Europe and the ECHR.261 Council of Europe members also feared that the 
Counsel would have to deny Russian citizens the opportunity to apply to the 
ECHR for relief for human rights violations.262 A compromise deal was 
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subsequently pushed through in the Council of Europe in early 2019 to reinstate 
Russia’s voting rights after Russia threatened to leave the Council of Europe; 
and human rights organizations argued that Russia’s expulsion or departure from 
the Council would be disastrous for human rights in Russia.263 Thus, any attempt 
to limit Russian representation in the Council of Europe would result in a finan-
cially crippled Council of Europe, which would not only harm the mission of 
both the Council and the ECHR, but also Russian citizens who would not receive 
ECHR protection at all.  
Russia has demonstrated an obvious unwillingness to act on outside criticism 
of its newly created legal regime, allowing its Constitutional Court to trump the 
ECHR as the state of affairs remains unchanged. The largest threat Russia’s new 
legal regime poses to the ECHR system, however, is that it could “embolden 
other member states to take similar actions and establish their own procedures 
for rejecting ECHR judgments.”264 Central and Eastern European states have ex-
pressed more conservative tendencies and expressed concern over the more lib-
eral principles set forth by the ECHR, actualizing this threat to ECHR suprem-
acy.265 In particular, Hungary and Poland’s governments have recently been 
criticized for their more conservative stances.266 Tensions in Poland over queer 
rights have reached a boiling point as anti-queer actors both in the Polish Gov-
ernment and Society are in conflict with pro-queer rights activists.267 
While the Council of Europe could focus its efforts on trying to get Russia to 
change its law, the Council and the ECHR should not do so at the expense of 
allowing other countries to take similar action. Instead, the Council of Europe 
and the ECHR should focus on a dialogue with Russia and concentrate political 
capital toward ensuring the conservative movements in other member states do 
not enact similar legal regimes, which could undermine the entire human rights 
system of the ECHR.  
As discussed above, since taking affirmative action against Russia may push 
Russia out of the Council of Europe with detrimental effects to the Council and 
human rights, the best way to address the problems presented by the Russian 
Constitutional Court’s authority to override ECHR is to maintain a dialogue with 
Russia while thwarting other countries from creating similar regimes. The Coun-
cil of Europe can do very little in terms of sanctioning Russia while it is so will-
ing to leave the Council; however, Russia was adamant about remaining in the 
Council following its invasion of Crimea and subsequent loss of its voting rights 
in the Parliamentary Assembly as a consequence of the invasion; this suggests it 
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still has an interest in being in rather than out of the Council.268 Therefore, the 
most optimal approach for now is to work with Russia. Yet, the Council of Eu-
rope must ensure that other member states do not proliferate Russia’s actions.  
 
C. The ECHR Could Apply the Russian Constitution to Support its 
Judgments  
 
Another way the ECHR could ensure its judgments are implemented in Russia 
and not subsequently overruled by the Russian Constitutional Court is by chang-
ing the language of the judgments. As stated above, Russia’s Constitution inte-
grates international law and norms into its legal system.269 Literature on how to 
address the Russian Constitutional Court’s recent move against ECHR judg-
ments has suggested the ECHR use the Russian Constitution and the history 
around its adoption to justify the ECHR’s judgments.270 Through this approach, 
Russia would be violating its own constitution in refusing to comply with ECHR 
judgments because the Russian Constitution “has integrated international legal 
principles and international human rights norms into its text.”271  
Zhandov illustrates how the ECHR does not justify its decision by using do-
mestic law. While the Court looks to domestic law to see if the violation of the 
Convention is grounded in the domestic law of the party, the ECHR only applies 
case law and the Convention when deciding the merits of a case. As Zhandov 
shows, the ECHR spends most of its time applying principles from past deci-
sions. Most notably in Zhandov, Bayev was cited repeatedly. Thus, there is plenty 
of room for the Court to include an analysis of the Russian Constitution and its 
applicable principles to a case long before the Russian Constitutional Court can 
determine whether ECHR’s judgment in the case is consistent with the Russian 
Constitution.  
An initial problem with this approach is that the Russian Constitutional Court 
has already upheld the Gay Propaganda law as constitutional.272 So, if the ECHR 
took the chance to argue in another judgment that the Gay Propaganda law was 
unconstitutional because it violates Russia’s international obligations, such a de-
cision would be futile because the Russian Constitutional Court has already de-
cided the opposite. For the same reason, the Russian Constitutional Court is un-
likely to try to direct lawmakers toward a compromise to bring Russia into 
compliance with cases such as Bayev and Zhdanov because the Constitutional 
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Court has already declared restriction on queer rights to be constitutional. If the 
ECHR took such action, the state of affairs would be a stalemate because there 
would be a judgment by the ECHR in conflict with a judgment of the Russian 
Constitutional Court, a court that has already been given the authority to super-
sede the ECHR.  
Moreover, Russia is not going to be interested in following interpretations of 
its constitution by a European court in Strasbourg—another issue in the ECHR 
trying to use the Russian Constitution to bring Russia into compliance. The Pres-
ident of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valerij Zorkin, has criticized the 
ECHR, in his academic capacity, for its overly liberal decisions.273 Zorkin has 
argued that the ECHR should consider social and cultural aspects of a country 
when making its ruling.274 Further, he has insisted that “issues relating to pro-
found values forming the ‘moral and cultural code’ of a nation” comprise a na-
tions “constitutional identity.”275 He is joined by other judges who “openly crit-
iciz[e] ‘legislative novelties’ introduced in the majority of Western countries as 
‘shocking’ and ‘directly violating fundamental religious commandments.’”276 
These statements from Russian judges do not indicated that they would be will-
ing to accept the interpretation of their Constitution by a foreign Court estab-
lished by the West.  
Finally, the ECHR using the Russian Constitution to justify its judgments is 
unworkable because it undermines the Court. As Article 46 of the Convention 
provides, all judgments of the ECHR are binding.277 The ECHR is supposed to 
have the final say on all matters under the Convention without exception.278 If 
the ECHR started to use domestic law to justify its decisions, it would take away 
from the principle that all that matters is the Convention and the ECHR’s case 
law which is what the parties to the Convention have agreed too. If the ECHR 
opened the door to applying domestic law to justify its decisions, nothing would 
be stopping a party to the Convention from amending their laws to weaken the 
judgment. Thus, the better option is for the ECHR to continue to only interpret 




The state of queer rights in Russia seems hopeless. Any attempt by the Council 
of Europe or the ECHR to take a tougher stance on forcing Russia to comply 
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with its obligations under the Convention to defend queer rights is met with 
fierce resistance from Russia. As the recent situation concerning Russia’s voting 
rights in the Parliamentary Assembly indicate, Russia may be willing to leave 
the Council of Europe altogether. Such a move would be detrimental to the 
Council and the ECHR, and as human rights organizations pointed out, Russia 
being out of the Council of Europe could decimate human rights in Russia en-
tirely. Considering the inability of Council and the Court to act, queer rights are 
only going to be protected from internal change and external pressure from other 
entities.  
As one scholar has pointed out, Russia “still cares about its image as a rule of 
law-based ‘civilized state’” for reasons of “international prestige” and “foreign 
investment.”279 However, “this consideration can no longer be taken for 
granted”280 because Russia still successfully negotiated a compromise to regain 
its voting rights and status in the Council of Europe despite facing sanctions from 
the West for its invasions and continued illegal occupation of Crimea.281 In clos-
ing this deal, the German Foreign Minister “said the compromise would ensure 
‘millions of Russians the protection of the European Court of Human Rights.’”282 
Russia’s willingness to negotiate a deal demonstrates a desire on Russia’s part 
to remain a part of the Council and continue to submit itself to the jurisdiction of 
the ECHR.  
The fact of the matter is that there is little the Council of Europe can do, and 
despite economic sanctions, Russia has continued to press forward. From ignor-
ing the judgments of the ECHR to maintaining its presence in Crimea, Russia is 
ignoring pressure on all fronts from the West. Economic sanctions are a prime 
example of Russia’s growing immunity to international pressure, as Russia con-
tinues to adapt to them.283  
The best hope for queer rights and the right to assembly under the Convention 
ten years after Alekseyev appears to be continued internal activism. Actors like 
Mr. Alekseyev need to be wary, however, of their treatment of the ECHR as 
discussed in Zhandov.284 Although the Court is in a difficult position, Zhandov 
signifies that the ECHR and all its jurisprudence support the protection of queer 
rights under the Convention. The Court disciplining an applicant by dismissing 
an application for vile behavior and statements harms those who stand to gain 
from the ECHR’s protection through its case law. Inevitably, there will be an-
other judgment about queer rights in Russia, and Zhandov will be cited. Every 
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case expands and strengthens the Court’s pro-queer rights jurisprudence. Unfor-
tunately, the ECHR is limited on how far it can act to implement its judgments, 
so activists must work to change Russia from the inside out.  
Of course, simply concluding that domestic activism is how to advance queer 
rights in Russia is easier said than done. Pro-queer rights organizations are find-
ing it more difficult to act, as laws are passed curtailing their ability to operate 
in Russia.285 Activists in Russia also need the support of the international com-
munity.286 One way to support these organizations is to give them money for 
lawyers since activists are arrested merely for their peaceful demonstrations, 
which are permitted under the Convention. Another way governments can help 
is through their willingness to expand asylum and visas to queer persons who 
need to the leave the country.287 Finally, if Russia does care about foreign invest-
ments, Western companies doing business in Russia should consider restricting 





The situation in Russia is bleak for queer rights. Zhandov is important because 
it summarizes the ECHR’s position on queer rights under the Convention. The 
judgment in the case acknowledges that for all parties to the Convention, and 
therefore all members of the Council of Europe, inter alia, the protection of mo-
rality and family values is not a legitimate justification for limiting the rights of 
queer persons. The ECHR firmly stated to Russia that “[t]here is no ambiguity 
about” where the member states of the Council of Europe stand on queer rights 
and that member states should and do recognize and promote the rights of queer 
persons, especially the freedom of assembly and association.288 The Court 
acknowledges the vital role the freedom of assembly and association play in ad-
vancing minority positions. By curtailing these rights, queer activists are hin-
dered from changing public opinion and challenging the government. Unfortu-
nately, the state of affairs between the Council of Europe, the ECHR, and Russia 
is precarious at best. The Court must be careful not to allow the Russian Consti-
tutional Court to undermine the human rights system under the Convention and 
the ECHR. At the same time, the Council is limited in the action it can take 
because an affirmative action against Russia may lead to a Russian exit from the 
Council, imperiling human rights in general in Russia. These situational 
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problems between the ECHR, the Council, and Russia leaves any hope of change 
up to queer activists in Russia who are in a desperate situation as well.  
Thus, ten years after Alekseyev, while the ECHR has remained firm in its 
acknowledgement of queer rights, the situation for queer rights in Russia has 
gotten worse. The only hope for meaningful change in Russia appears to be that 
activists somehow change the minds of a majority of Russians who then can 
challenge the government. Though European institutions appear to be unable to 
advance queer rights in Russia, queer activists are not going anywhere and will 
continue to advocate for their rights until they are acknowledged and protected 
in Russia.  
 
